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THE DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS OF AT-LARGE
ELECTIONS
BARBARA L. BERRY* AND THOMAS R. DYE**
I. SOPHISTICATED MODES OF DISCRIMINATION
In Baker v. Carr,' the Court held unconstitutional Tennessee's
apportionment statutes and declared that denial of a citizen's right
to fair and effective participation in the electoral process was a
justiciable issue. And in Reynolds v. Sims, 2 decided two years later,
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the majority: "Full and effec-
tive participation by all citizens in state government requires, there-
fore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election
of members of his state legislature." 3 This goal of fair and effective
representation could be achieved by constructing districts, in both
houses of state legislatures, "as nearly of equal population as is
practicable." 4
Baker and Reynolds were followed by a number of "one person,
one vote" 5 cases designed to make effective representation a reality
in American society. The reality exists today, however, only for the
numerical majority. Politically effective representation for racial
and other minorities has not been achieved. The Supreme Court's
emphasis on equality of population among electoral districts and its
reluctance to develop realistic restraints on the discretion of dis-
tricting authorities has threatened to transform the reapportion-
ment revolution into a "Gerrymandering Revolution."'
* B.A. 1969, Florida State University; M.A. 1970, University of South Florida; J.D. ex-
pected 1979, Florida State University.
** B.S. 1957, M.A. 1959, Pennsylvania State University; Ph.D. 1961, University of Penn-
sylvania. Coordinator of Policy Science Program and professor of government, Florida State
University. Past secretary of the American Political Science Association and past president
of the Southern Political Science Association. Author of numerous articles and books on
American government and public policy.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. Id. at 565.
4. Id. at 577.
5. The expression "one man, one vote" was originally used by Justice Harlan in a concur-
ring opinion in Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 856 (1961) (all lawyers in Wisconsin were
required to join the politically active state bar and pay dues). It was borrowed by Justice
Douglas in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963), an early apportionment case, and
changed to "one person, one vote." However, the majority of the Court preferred Justice
Harlan's rendition and "one man, one vote" became the more popular alternative until
Justice Rehnquist broke with precedent in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319 (1973), and
again substituted the word "person" for the word "man."
6. Elliott, Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora, and Procrustes Unbound: The Political Conse-
quences of Reapportionment, 37 U. CI. L. REv. 474, 483 (1970).
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Gerrymandering 7-'"discriminatory districting which operates
unfairly to inflate the political strength of one group and deflate
that of another"-can be as invidious as malapportionment of pop-
ulation in depriving voters of an equal voice in choosing their repre-
sentatives. The objective of gerrymandering is to create an electoral
advantage for a particular group by diluting the political effective-
ness of competitive groups. One of the most widespread means of
diluting the political effectiveness of a disfavored minority group is
through the use of multi-member districts. In these districts, a large
number of voters choose more than one representative to serve the
entire district. Thus, a multi-member district might contain 500,000
people and elect five representatives, while a single-member district
nearby might have only 100,000 people and elect one representative.
The constitutional imperative of equal population districts is not
violated, but the political consequences are vastly different. The
dominant political faction in the multi-member district is likely to
elect all five representatives. If, however, the district were divided
into five single-member districts, representatives from different fac-
tions would be much more likely to be elected.9
Though multi-member districts can be found at all political levels
within a state, their effect is particularly invidious on racial minori-
ties in city elections. In well over half the cities in the United States
all representatives are elected at-large."0 An additional thirteen per-
cent elect at least one or more members of the city council at-large."
7. The term is derived from wildly-shaped districts created when Governor Elbridge Gerry
sought to redistrict the Massachusetts Legislature in 1812. The shape of one proposed district
resembled a salamander. Note, Chavis v. Whitcomb: Apportionment, Gerrymandering, and
Black Voting Rights, 24 RuTrGs L. REv. 521, 524 n.13 (1970). There are two distinct kinds
of gerrymandering: delineational and institutional. Governor Gerry was engaging in delinea-
tional gerrymandering when he created irrationally-shaped legislative districts in an effort to
gain a majority for the Democrats in the Massachusetts Senate. The term institutional
gerrymandering refers to the use of multi-member districts to dilute the voting strength of a
minority group submerged within a large majority-controlled district. Engstrom, The Su-
preme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair
and Effective Representation, 1976 AIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 279-81.
8. Dixon, The Court, the People, and "One Man, One Vote" in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE
1970's 7, 29 (N. Polsby ed. 1971).
9. The effect of multi-member districts in underrepresenting minority interests has been
the subject of much commentary. See Baker, Gerrymandering: Privileged Sanctuary or Next
Judicial Target? in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's 121, 123 (N. Polsby ed. 1971); Carpeneti,
Legislative Apportionment: Multimember Districts and Fair Representation, 120 U. PA. L.
REv. 666, 671 (1972); Engstrom, supra note 7, at 280-81; Rosenberg, Reapportionment and
Minority Politics, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 107, 108 (1974); and Comment, Effective
Representation and Multimember Districts, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1577, 1578 (1970).
10. City Governments: Form, Structure, Election of Mayor and Council, 8 UPB. DATA
SERV. REP. 1, 8 (1976). "At-large" is the term used when all of the councilmen are elected by
the entire city. The city is one large multi-member district. A single-member district in a
city is called a ward.
11. Id.
AT-LARGE ELECTIONS
The trend in recent decades, as part of the reform movement in
municipal government, has been toward the increased use of at-
large elections in the cities. 2 This trend may well accelerate as cities
turn to at-large elections to meet the Court's demands that legisla-
tive districts have equal populations. 3 In contrast the trend in state
legislative districts is toward single-member districts. According to
the Council of State Governments, in 1968 forty-six percent of the
states used some multi-member districts to elect their state senators
and sixty-six percent to elect their state representatives. By 1978 the
percentage of states had declined to twenty-six percent for the sena-
tors and forty percent for representatives. In 1968 twenty-seven per-
cent of state senators and fifty-three percent of state representatives
were elected from multi-member districts. The percentages de-
creased to fifteen percent and thirty-six percent respectively by
1978.11
Not only is the use of at-large elections more widespread for cities
than for state legislatures, but at-large elections in cities have a
more discriminatory effect than they do statewide. In statewide
elections, it is possible that a large minority group in one multi-
member district will be unable to elect any legislators, while in
another multi-member district where the same group is a slight
majority, they will elect the entire slate of legislators. Thus, the
multi-member electoral system may hinder a group in one district
but prove an advantage in another. In at-large elections in cities this
is not possible. There is no way to balance out the discrimination
against a particular minority group because the entire city is one
huge election district. The minority's loss is absolute. The same
results would occur if all representatives to a state legislature were
elected statewide.15
12. Data from the International City Managers Association indicate that in 1951, 56.5%
of reporting cities over 5,000 population used at-large elections. That percentage had in-
creased to 69% by 1976. For the 1951 data see THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 1951 at 42 (C. Ridley
& 0. Nolting eds.). For 1976, see City Governments: Form, Structure, Election of Mayor and
Council, supra note 10, at 8.
13. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 157 n.37 (1971), the Supreme Court indicated
that there had been a slight increase in the use of multi-member districts by the states and
that undoubtedly one of the reasons for this increase was that some states switched to multi-
member districts as a result of the apportionment cases. Although the Court's data are
incorrect, see note 14 infra and accompanying text, its reasoning is valid. In Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), the Court applied the "one man, one vote" standard to local
governments. As districting authorities have been prohibited from favoring those in power
by unequal legislative districts they have had to turn to other electoral devices such as at-
large elections.
14. For the 1968 data see THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVENMENTS, 17 THE BOOK OF THE STATES
66-67 (1968-69). For the 1978 data, see THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 22 THE BOOK OF
THE STATES 14-15 (1978-79).
15. Derfner, Multi-Member Districts and Black Voters, 2 BLACK L.J. 120, 128 (1972);
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The minority most affected by at-large elections in American
cities is the blacks.' Concentrated in a few ghetto areas, blacks
often have the votes to determine the outcome of an election in a
ward system." But in an at-large system, they remain a minority
and their candidates are defeated. Often, other minority groups
have responded to election losses by forming coalitions with like-
minded groups, but because of racial hostility, blacks have gene-
rally been unable to form effective coalitions with other minority
groups. S
Moreover, because it is necessary in at-large elections to appeal
to a larger electorate, such elections require greater financial re-
sources and put a premium on the endorsement of civic associations
and, most important, local newspapers." Blacks have frequently
been unable to obtain the support necessary to run a successful
citywide campaign. Those blacks who have appealed successfully to
the larger white vote are often not the most effective advocates of
black interests.20 Although ward elections do not guarantee repre-
sentation for blacks on city councils, this article will demonstrate
empirically that at-large elections are directly responsible for black
underrepresentation on the councils of large cities.
If. THE SUPREME COURT AND MULTI-MEMBER DISTRICTS
A. Baker v. Carr and the Reapportionment Decisions
Until Baker v. Carr' was decided in 1962, even gross inequities
in the population of legislative districts did not present a justiciable
controversy. But in Baker, the Court overruled a line of cases hold-
ing that legislative apportionment was a political question." This
opened the door to one of the most bitter and protracted political
controversies to face our nation. The Court based its decisions on
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. At issue
Jewell, Local Systems of Representation: Political Consequences and Judicial Choices, 36
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 790, 800 (1968).
16. The data contained in this paper focus on the issue of the dilution of the black vote
in city elections. For a discussion of the related problem of the dilutive effect of multi-member
districts on the black vote in the election of state legislatures, see Smith, The Failure of
Reapportionment; The Effect of Reapportionment on the Election of Blacks to Legislative
Bodies, 18 How. L.J. 639 (1975).
17. Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-large Elections: The Dilution Problem, 10 GA.
L. REV. 353, 355 (1976); Jewell, supra note 15, at 800.
18. Derfner, supra note 15, at 127-28.
19. See E. BA1ELD & J. WILSON, CITY PouTics 94-96, 307-08 (1963).
20. Karnig, Black Representation on City Councils: The Impact of District Elections and
Socioeconomic Factors, 12 Uma. AFF. Q. 223, 237 (1976).
21. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
22. The leading case in the area was Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), in which
the Court held that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction in cases concerning legislative
apportionment and that the issues were not justiciable.
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in these cases was the very nature of representative government and
the role the judiciary should play in guaranteeing the individual's
rights in the electoral process.
In Reynolds v. Sims, 3 the Court articulated the first judicial stan-
dard to be applied in reapportionment cases: the equal protection
clause required that districts for both houses of state legislatures be
as nearly equal in population as practicable.24 The essence of repre-
sentative government, according to the Reynolds Court, is self-
government. "[Elvery citizen has an inalienable right to full and
effective participation in the political process of his State's legisla-
tive bodies. ' 25 The Court unhesitatingly thrust itself into the
"political thickets and mathematical quagmires"2 of reapportion-
ment and declared that any denial of the constitutionally protected
right of fair and effective representation demands judicial protec-
tion.27 Deviations from the strict population standards of Reynolds
were acceptable only if "based on legitimate considerations incident
to the effectuation of a rational state policy .... ,,28 Four years
later, the Court held in Avery v. Midland County, that the Reynolds
standard of population equality applied to local government units
as well.?
There has been increasing realization by blacks and whites alike
that fair and effective representation of minority interests can be
diluted in very sophisticated ways. Early in its consideration of
apportionment the Supreme Court committed itself in principle to
eradicating "'sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of dis-
23. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), was the leading case of six decided the same
day. The others are: Lucas v. Forty-fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
24. 377 U.S. at 577.
25. Id. at 565.
26. Id. at 566.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 579. Such justifications might include: maintaining the integrity of political
subdivisions, maintaining the compactness and contiguousness of districts, and recognizing
natural boundaries. Id. at 580-81. In Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), the Burger Court
upheld an apportionment plan which diverged from mathematical equality by 16.4%, justi-
fied by the state's desire to keep political subdivisions intact. The Court noted that while
such a deviation "may well approach tolerable limits, we do not believe it exceeds them."
Id. at 329.
The Burger Court has also allowed "de minimus" variations from population equality
without justification. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). In White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755 (1973), the Court held a maximum deviation of 9.9% from the ideal to be de
minimus.
29. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). In Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), the Court allowed a
11.9% deviation for the election of Rockland County board of supervisors, thus indicating that
historical patterns in certain cases might be sufficient to justify some differences.
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crimination.' ,3 In practice, however, the Court has not dealt effec-
tively with one of the most sophisticated means of diluting minority
votes-multi-member districts.
Black challenges to electoral practices which discriminate against
their constitutional right to vote are not new. The fifteenth amend-
ment, which prohibits the "denial or abridgement" of the right to
vote on racial grounds,3' has been used by the Court to invalidate
the failure of election officials to count ballots of black voters, 3 the
grandfather clause,33 the white primary,"3 and, most recently, the
redrawing of the city limits of Tuskegee, Alabama, to exclude al-
most all black residents.3
Racial minorities have also been helped by challenges to limita-
tions on voting brought under the equal protection clause on other
than racial grounds. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,31 the
Court declared voting a fundamental right. Indeed voting is the
fundamental right because it is preservative of all other basic civil
and political rights.37 The poll tax, 3 property qualifications, 39 and
lengthy residency requirements ° were struck down by the Court as
unduly restricting the franchise. The state was unable to meet its
burden of proving that such requirements served a compelling state
interest.
What is new is an equal protection challenge by racial minorities
that certain electoral devices dilute the black vote. Blacks are no
30. 377 U.S. at 563 (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)).
31. The fifteenth amendment has seldom been used in recent decades except as a source
of congressional power "because of the difficulty in proving that a given 'denial or abridge-
ment' of the right to vote is on account of race." Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right
to Vote, 26 VAND. L. Rzv. 523, 560 (1973). For a discussion of the fifteenth amendment, see
id. at 561-63. See also Bonapfel, supra note 17, at 360-65.
32. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
33. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
34. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
35. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
36. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
37. The idea that the right to vote is fundamental was first articulated by the Court in
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). It was reaffirmed in Harper, 383 U.S. at 667,
as well as in Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
38. 383 U.S. at 663.
39. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (unconstitutional to limit
voting in school board elections to parents of students or owners of taxable real property in
the district). See also Hillv. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.
204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). The Court has been less demand-
ing of elections in special purpose districts. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (allowed voting limited to land owners in water storage
district).
40. A law limiting voting to persons who have been in the state one year was invalidated
in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). The Court upheld a 50-day registration period in
Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973).
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longer claiming that they are being denied the right to cast their
votes. Rather, they are claiming that at-large elections have the
effect of diminishing the impact that their votes have on electing
candidates to public office. It is in the area of multi-member dis-
tricting that this issue of the dilution of black votes is most clearly
drawn in the continuing reapportionment struggle. Thus far, the
Supreme Court has been unable to conclude that multi-member
districts impermissibly infringe on the right to vote or that the
infringement which occurs falls disproportionately on blacks. Nev-
ertheless, the argument posed by the black voters presents legiti-
mate grounds for invoking the equal protection clause.
Before turning to an analysis of how the Court has dealt with
multi-member districts and why they have dealt with them as they
have, it is helpful to keep in mind the thesis of this article. Available
judicial methods are not adequate to evaluate the impact that at-
large elections have on the black vote in city elections. Initially the
Court hesitated to enter the apportionment controversy at all be-
cause of a lack of "judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it."" But the inequities of unequal legislative
districts compelled the Court to act. The Court invoked the equal
protection clause and held that anything short of strict numerical
equality among legislative districts was constitutionally suspect.4 1
However, the inherent inequities of multi-member districts are
not as obvious to the Court as are the inequities of malapportioned
legislative districts. The Court has recognized the potential of
multi-member districts to dilute black votes, but the Justices have
been unwilling to this point to rely on their own sense of fundamen-
tal unfairness to declare them per se unconstitutional. It is unneces-
sary for the Court to rely on its own perception of complex political
and social problems. Political scientists and social scientists gener-
ally have concentrated their efforts in the past few decades on ana-
lyzing just such problems empirically.
At-large elections are associated with the municipal reform move-
ment. In general, the reform movement sought to eliminate parti-
41. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939) used the phrase, "the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination." Id. at
454-55.
42. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan dissenting in Baker emphatically denied that equal-
ity demanded districts of equal population. Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
The notion that representation proportioned to the geographic spread of popula-
tion is so universally accepted as a necessary element of equality between man and
man that it must be taken to be the standard of a political equality preserved by
the Fourteenth Amendment-that it is, in appellants' words "the basic principle
of representative government"-is, to put it bluntly, not true.
369 U.S. at 301.
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sanship, "machines," and "bosses" from municipal government.
Supporters of the movement offered a variety of structural changes
designed to achieve these ends.43 These structural reforms included
the city manager form of government, nonpartisan elections, munic-
ipal civil service systems, modern city planning, and metropolitan
governmental consolidations, as well as at-large election districts.
Today a majority of American cities elect their councilmen in non-
partisan elections in at-large districts. Sixty-nine percent of Ameri-
can cities elect their councilmen in at-large districts, nineteen per-
cent in ward districts, and thirteen percent use a combination of at-
large and ward districts." This reflects the general success of the
municipal reform movement in America.
There is no evidence that at-large elections were designed pur-
posefully to discriminate against racial minorities. Instead, at-large
districts were intended to promote a citywide approach to municipal
problems among councilmen. Reformers believed that ward constit-
uencies encouraged parochial views, neighborhood interests,
"logrolling," and other characteristics of "ward politics." These
supposedly undesirable characteristics occurred because council-
men were responsible to local majorities in the particular sections
or wards from which they were elected. In contrast, councilmen
elected at-large are responsible to citywide majorities. In theory,
this should encourage impartial, cosmopolitan, and communitywide
attitudes. Moreover, in municipalities with the city manager form
of government, it is argued that the manager can be more effective
in serving the "general good" of the whole community if he is re-
sponsible to councilmen elected at-large rather than by wards. Oc-
casionally, it is even argued that at-large elections result in the
selection of "better men" for the council, although recent research
suggests that there are no significant differences in the social status,
occupations, or experience of councilmen elected at-large and coun-
cilmen elected by wards.5
However, black representation is significantly" greater in cities
with ward elections than in cities with at-large elections. From a
study of the data contained in this article we concluded that blacks
living in cities with at-large elections have half the chance of elect-
43. T. DYE, POLITICS IN STATES AND CoMMuNrriEs 248-76 (2d ed. 1973). See generally R.
HOISTADTER, THE AGE OF REFoiM (1955).
44. See note 10 supra.
45. Rehfus, Are At-Large Elections Best for Council Manager Cities, 61 NAT'L Civic R.
236-41 (1972).
46. The term "significance" is used in social science statistical analysis to indicate that
the observed relationship has a probability of occurring by chance only five percent of the
time or less.
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ing a member of their own race as blacks in cities using wards.
Blacks received only forty-two percent of the representation their
population warranted in at-large election cities and eighty-five per-
cent of their deserved representation in ward cities. 7 But this study
goes one step beyond demonstrating that there is a relationship
between the type of election and black representation on city coun-
cils. It also shows that the major cause of black underrepresentation
is at-large elections. We looked at a variety of socioeconomic vari-
ables that might have explained the disparity in black representa-
tion " and found that at-large elections were the single most influen-
tial variable. This kind of causal analysis can be equated with the
causation-in-fact analysis that arises in the law of torts.4 The other
element of causation, proximate cause, requires that the cause be
closely enough related to the effect so that those affected have a
legal right to relief. While our findings showed that other socio-
economic variables had an impact on black underrepresentation,
at-large elections, independent of these other variables, signifi-
cantly reduced black representation on city councils. In summary,
our data indicate that: (1) there is a significant relationship be-
tween at-large elections and black underrepresentation; (2) at-
large elections are the major cause of black underrepresentation on
city councils; and (3) at-large elections significantly reduce black
representation on city councils.
47. The first comprehensive study of cities across the nation, by political scientist Albert
K. Karnig, found that blacks received only forty-six percent of the representation they de-
served, based on their proportion of the population, in at-large cities, compared to seventy-
seven percent of their deserved representation, based on population, in ward cities. Karnig,
supra note 20, at 229. Karnig examined black representation in 139 municipalities of 25,000
population or more across the country in which blacks constituted fifteen percent or more of
the population. Id. at 225. He concluded that "[alt-large elections distill minority voting
power." Id. at 235.
The differences between Karnig's data and our data can easily be explained. First, Karnig's
data are based on a sample of 139 cities of the 185 with more than 25,000 population in which
blacks constitute fifteen percent of the population. Id. at 225. Our data are based on all 105
cities with more than 50,000 population in which blacks constitute fifteen percent of the
population. Second, Karnig's data on black councilmen were taken from the NATIONAL ROSTER
oF BLACK ELEMCTD OMClAs, 1972, while our data were obtained from telephone interviews
with city attorneys and blacks in all designated cities. See section m. infra.
48. See notes 180-86 infra and accompanying text.
49. The idea of using a causational approach to evaluate an equal protection case origi-
nated with Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 36 (1977). "Mr. Eisenberg develops a new theory of dispropor-
tionate impact, the 'causation principle,' which will permit courts to find equal protection
violations when uneven impact is accompanied by factors more susceptible to proof than
intentional discrimination." Id. at 36 [editorial note]. We commend it as an extremely
provocative article. The problem of unmanageable legal standards in equal protection cases
would in large part be solved if the Supreme Court adopted Eisenberg's approach.
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B. The Early Multi-Member District Cases
The first Supreme Court case to mention multi-member districts
was Reynolds v. Sims. 50 In that lengthy decision, in which the Su-
preme Court announced that both houses of state legislatures must
be apportioned on an equal population basis, multi-member dis-
tricts were mentioned only twice." While rejecting the federal anal-
ogy for state legislatures, the Court wrote that bicameralism is not
rendered "anachronistic and meaningless. '5 2 The differences in the
"composition and complexion" 53 of the two bodies of a state legisla-
ture could be maintained by one body having "at least some multi-
member districts."5 The Supreme Court did not discourage the use
of multi-member districts. So long as the requirements of the equal
protection clause were met, the states were free to use other electoral
devices to respond to uniquely local interests not reflected in popu-
lation statistics. Multi-member districts were one device to give the
states that flexibility.
The Court again mentioned multi-member districts later in the
opinion: "Single-member districts may be the rule in one State,
while another State might desire to achieve some flexibility by cre-
ating multimember or floterial districts. ' 5  The Court saw multi-
member districts as a means of ameliorating the restrictive impact
that the Reynolds decision was going to have on the states' control
of their electoral process. But multi-member districts were men-
tioned only tangentially in Reynolds, and the Court's statements
were not taken as dispositive of the issue.
Though the Court in Reynolds did not view multi-member dis-
tricts as constitutionally defective, it was sensitive nevertheless to
the possibility that other electoral devices might violate the equal
protection requirement of fair and effective representation.
"[Clareful judicial scrutiny must of course be given, in evaluating
state apportionment schemes, to the character as well as the degree
of deviations from a strict population basis."5 Unequal legislative
districting was struck down because it violated the equal protection
standard of fair and effective representation. But the Court did not
foreclose the possibility that multi-member districts, in the right
circumstances, might also violate that standard.
50. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
51. Id. at 576-77, 579.
52. Id. at 576.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 577.
55. Id. at 579 (footnotes omitted).
56. Id. at 581.
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In Lucas v. Forty-fourth General Assembly of Colorado,57 a com-
panion case to Reynolds, the Court also mentioned multi-member
districts. The Court held that Colorado's state legislative reappor-
tionment plan was unconstitutional because it "clearly involves
departures from population-based representation too extreme to be
constitutionally permissible.. -.. 5,8 In dicta, the Court for the first
time expressed the view that multi-member districts were poten-
tially undesirable.
The district court in Lucas had asserted that the apportionment
scheme should be accepted because "the Colorado voters made a
definitive choice between two contrasting alternatives and indicated
that 'minority process in the Senate is what they want'. . . . 59 The
Supreme Court rejected that assertion because "the choice pre-
sented to the Colorado electorate, in voting on these two proposed
constitutional amendments, was hardly as clear-cut as the court
below regarded it." 0 The plan rejected by the voters, although it
met the equal population districting standard of Reynolds, con-
tained the "undesirable feature" of multi-member districts."
"[N]either of the proposed plans was, in all probability, wholly
acceptable to the voters .... "61
The Court was making the very narrow point that the Colorado
voters were not offered a broad enough choice. The resolution of the
issue was irrelevant to the holding in the case, because the Court
went on to say that, whether or not the electorate approved the plan,
it would be struck down by the Court if it failed to meet equal
protection standards.6 3 However, the Court's comments on multi-
member districts indicated, for the first time, a judicial awareness
that such districts do have some undesirable characteristics. Specif-
ically, the Court found multi-member districts objectionable be-
cause, first, an intelligent choice among candidates was difficult for
the voter because ballots were long and cumbersome; second, the
representatives had no identifiable constituencies within the popu-
57. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
58. Id. at 734-35. The variation in the senate legislative districts was 3.6 to 1, id. at 728,
and in the house legislative districts 1.7 to 1, id. at 727. Although the Court did not specifi-
cally hold that the maximum population variance ratio in the house was constitutionally
defective, the ratio in the senate clearly was and that was enough to invalidate the entire plan.
59. Id. at 732.
60. Id. at 731.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 732.
63. Id. at 736. In the Court's words: "An individual's constitutionally protected right to
cast an equally weighted vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a majority of a State's
electorate, if the apportionment scheme adopted by the voters fails to measure up to the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
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lous counties; and, third, the residents of the populous counties
had no single representative to represent them. 4 Though it recog-
nized these undesirable features, the Court made quite clear that
multi-member districts were not per se unconstitutional. 5
The first case in which the Court squarely confronted the issue of
the constitutionality of multi-member districts was Fortson v.
Dorsey.61 Two challenges to multi-member districts were raised in
Fortson. The Court's attention was focused primarily on the issue
of whether use of both single-member districts and multi-member
districts in elections for the Georgia Senate resulted in invidious
discrimination against the residents of multi-member districts. The
large counties of Georgia had been divided into districts. The candi-
dates were voted on at-large in these counties, but state law required
that one representative be elected from each district. The voters in
the districts in the large counties contended that they had to join
with other districts in the county to elect their representative,
whereas voters in the single-member districts were allowed to elect
their own senator. 7 The district court held that this system violated
the equal protection clause.68 In reversing," the Supreme Court
emphasized that "substantial equality of population"70 was the test
and that that standard was met.
While generally unsympathetic to the argument that there are
differences in representational effectiveness between single-member
and multi-member districts,7 the Court has been more sympathetic
64. Id. at 731.
65. In a footnote following the listing of these undesirable features the Court wrote:
We do not intimate that apportionment schemes which provide for the at-large
election of a number of legislators from a county, or any political subdivision, are
constitutionally defective. Rather, we merely point out that there are certain as-
pects of electing legislators at large from a county as a whole that might well make
the adoption of such a scheme undesirable to many voters residing in multimember
counties.
Id. n.21.
66. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
67. Dorsey v. Fortson, 228 F. Supp. 259, 263 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
68. Id. at 261.
69. Specifically the Supreme Court held:
In reversing the District Court we should emphasize that the equal-protection claim
below was based upon an alleged infirmity that attaches to the statute on its face.
Agreeing with appellees' contention that the multi-member constituency feature of
the Georgia scheme was per se bad, the District Court entered the decree on sum-
mary judgment. We treat the question as presented in that context, and our opinion
is not to be understood to say that in all circumstances or under all circumstances
such a system as Georgia has will comport with the dictates of the Equal Protection
Clause.
379 U.S. at 438-39.
70. Id. at 436 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)).
71. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Burns
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to the claim that multi-member districts dilute the voting power of
racial minorities. In Fortson, the appellees (plaintiffs below) as-
serted "that the county-wide election method was resorted to by
Georgia in order to minimize the strength of racial and political
minorities in the populous urban counties. 7 2 However, as the Court
pointed out, that "bald assertion" was raised in only one short para-
graph of the appellees' brief. It was never seriously pressed, and no
proof was offered to support it.3 Because the dilution claim had not
been properly raised and argued, the Court stressed that its decision
in Fortson had no bearing on the dilution challenge."
Therefore, multi-member districts were not to be per se unconsti-
tutional, but the Court left open the possibility that such districts
might function in an unconstitutional manner. The Court stated:
It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member
constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a
particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.
When this is demonstrated it will be time enough to consider
whether the system still passes constitutional muster.75
This statement became the basis for all future dilution challenges
to multi-member districts. Fortson opened the door by making the
potential minimization of the voting strength of racial minorities by
multi-member districts a justiciable issue. Morever, unlike the ar-
gument that there are differences in representational effectiveness
between single-member and multi-member districts, the dilution
v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966). In White, the plaintiffs argued that the use of single-
member and multi-member districts invidiously discriminated against voters in single-
member districts. For a discussion of that view, see Baker, supra note 9, at 128-29; Banzhaf,
Multi-Member Electoral Districts-Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75
YALE L.J. 1309 (1966).
72. 379 U.S. at 439 (Harlan, J., concurring).
73. Id. The plaintiff in Fortson overlooked his most persuasive argument. Though hardly
mentioned by plaintiff, the dilution theory received a very positive response from the Court.
This is another example of how the right case, at the right time, but with the wrong argument,
can profoundly influence the development of law. Consider Gordon E. Baker's comment:
Fortson v. Dorsey is a perplexing case, in view of the fact that one ostensible
purpose of Georgia's multi-member provision was to prevent the election of a Negro
senator from Atlanta. The use of seven separate districts in 1962 resulted in the
election of the first Negro legislator since the Reconstruction. When Fortson v.
Dorsey restored the at-large provision, an all-white delegation emerged after the
next election. This would seem to be one example of the kind of evidence that might
still, in a case more skillfully argued and presented than Fortson, bring about
judicial invalidation of the Georgia multi-member practice.
Baker, supra note 9, at 125.
74. 379 U.S. at 439 (Harlan, J., concurring).
75. Id.
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challenge could not be swept aside by invoking the equality of popu-
lation requirements of Reynolds v. Sims."'
The Fortson opinion gave little indication of the kind of proof
necessary to invalidate a multi-member constituency apportion-
ment scheme; that was left to Burns v. Richardson." Though the
Burns Court upheld such a scheme in 1966, it did so because of an
insufficiency of proof. According to the Supreme Court, the district
court's ruling of the invalidity of a multi-member senatorial dis-
tricting scheme s had been based on conjecture and not on demon-
strated fact.7 As long as the standard of equality of legislative dis-
tricts was met, the only way to prove the invidiousness of multi-
member districts was from facts presented in the record.
The facts required by the Court did not include proof of both
intent and effect; either would be sufficient. According to the Burns
Court, echoing Fortson, a multi-member districting scheme was
subject to constitutional challenge if it "was designed to or would
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of
[minorities]. '"80 The Court indicated some specific ways an invidi-
ous effect could more easily be shown: if "districts are large in
relation to the total number of legislators, if districts are not appro-
priately subdistricted to assure distribution of legislators that are
resident over the entire district, or if such districts characterize both
houses of a bicameral legislature rather than one."'"
Though the Court spent much of its time in Burns criticizing the
appellants for failing to prove the invidious effect of multi-member
districts, an examination of the record shows that all three of the
Court's elements of proof were present in the Hawaiian reapportion-
ment scheme. 2 However, the Court was not ignoring its own stan-
dard of proof. It is incumbent upon the challenger to demonstrate
that multi-member districts dilute minority votes. To subject the
state's use of such districts to strict judicial scrutiny, the proof must
show a "real and appreciable impact"' on the voting rights of mi-
norities. The Court had no evidence to prove the impact was appre-
ciable.
76. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). It is implicit in Fortson that the Reynolds standard would not
be a defense to a dilution challenge. The Court pointed out that the dilution issue was wholly
separate from the representational differences issue and their holding had "no bearing on that
wholly separate question." 379 U.S. at 439 (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 58
(1964)). It was made quite explicit in Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
77. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
78. Holt v. Richardson, 240 F. Supp. 724 (D. Hawaii 1965).
79. 384 U.S. at 88.
80. Id. at 89.
81. Id. at 88.
82. Id. at 81.
83. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972).
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The data contained in this article show that, at least for blacks
in city elections, multi-member districts do significantly reduce
minority representation. Without benefit of that proof, the Burns
Court was trying to identify under precisely what circumstances the
effect of multi-member districts would be most invidious. The Court
sensed that the potential dilutive effect was greatest where the dis-
tricts were large and there was no requirement that candidates re-
side in particular areas of the district. If such districts were used for
both houses of a state legislature the discriminatory effect was com-
pounded. Not only does the data in this study substantiate the
Court's perception that in certain situations multi-member districts
have a greater dilutive effect on black representation, but also the
data show that these districts have a "real and appreciable impact"
on voting rights of minorities."'
If Burns had been the Court's final pronouncement on multi-
member districts, it is clear that the evidence contained in this
study would be sufficient to demonstrate that multi-member dis-
tricts have a substantial impact on the voting rights of blacks. Un-
fortunately the Court reentered the "political thicket" 5 in 1971, in
Whitcomb v. Chavis,81 and in 1973, in White v. Regester.7 The
Chavis Court rejected the standard of proof delineated in Burns. In
fact, when faced with the same allegation as was raised in Burns,
the Chavis Court refused to view the case as an infringement of the
fundamental right to vote but rather viewed it as a case of race
discrimination. This is significant because the pronouncement of
Fortson and Burns, that invidious discrimination could be shown if
multi-member districts "designedly or otherwise" minimized the
voting strength of racial minorities, was replaced by the necessity
84. It is useful to view the four types of electoral systems on a kind of continuum. At one
extreme is the exclusive use of large multi-member districts which, as the Court points out
in Burns and the data substantiate, is clearly the most invidiously discriminatory. If the
residency requirement is added, the discriminatory effect decreases. If multi-member dis-
tricts are combined with single-member districts, the discriminatory effect again decreases.
With the exclusive use of single-member districts, black representation approaches propor-
tionality. It was this kind of scheme the Court articulated in Burns, and as the data show,
they were correct. The question that remains is whether the discriminatory effect of multi-
member districts is "real and appreciable." Ultimately this is a question to be answered by
the Court. Blacks in ward cities receive twice the level of representation on city councils as
those in at-large cities. Analogizing to the apportionment cases, a population variance ratio
of 2:1 clearly would be unacceptable to the Court.
85. The Court was first warned of the danger of entering the "political thicket" by Justice
Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). He believed the remedy for
unfairness in districting is to secure state legislatures' willingness to apportion. There are
some constitutional commands that are not enforceable by the Courts. Id.
86. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
87. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
88. 384 U.S. at 88 (quoting Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439).
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of showing both effect and purpose." To appreciate fully this addi-
tional burden of proving discriminatory purpose, it is necessary to
examine the requirements of the equal protection clause.
C. Judicial Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause
1. Standards of Review
The Supreme Court has applied at least two different standards
of review to challenged legislation: the compelling state interest
standard and the rational basis standard. If the Court can be per-
suaded that the legislation under review involves an individual's
"fundamental rights" or creates a "suspect classification," the gov-
ernmental body responsible for the legislation must justify it as
necessary for achieving a legitimate and "compelling state inter-
est." 0 Otherwise the Court will use the rational basis standard and
accept any justification that is reasonably related to a legitimate
state interest.
The Supreme Court has characterized voting as a "fundamental
right. '""1 It is preservative of all civil and political rights." Any legis-
lative classifications that invaded or restrained the right to vote
would be "closely scrutinized and carefully confined"' 3 by the
Court.
Race, on the other hand, has been characterized as a "suspect
classification."' 4 As the Court declared in Korematsu v. United
States in 1944, "[A1ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights
of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say
that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."' 5
In both voting rights and racial discrimination cases, once the
compelling state interest standard is triggered, a presumption arises
that the plaintiff's rights were violated, and the burden shifts to the
state to justify the compelling necessity of its restriction of those
89. 403 U.S. at 149.
90. The Suprerge Court first articulated the compelling state interest standard in United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
91. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the Court held that
Virginia's $1.50 poll tax as a prerequisite to vote was constitutionally impermissible and
articulated the fundamental nature of the right to vote.
92. Id. at 667 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
93. Id. at 670.
94. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In this case the Court upheld the
government order to exclude Japanese from living in West Coast communities during World
War II. Korematsu is one of the few cases where once the compelling state interest standard
was invoked, the state was able to meet the burden of justifying the restriction.
95. Id. at 216.
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rights. In practice, the restriction is almost always struck down by
the Court. The critical question is: what triggers the compelling
state interest standard?
A fundamental rights case does not require proof of both discrimi-
natory purpose and disproportionate impact." A violation of the
fundamental right of an equal vote is triggered by a showing of
disproportionate impact alone. However, "not every limitation or
incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights"97 is constitution-
ally impermissible. Only those limitations which put a "real and
appreciable burden" on the right to vote are subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.98 This is the approach employed in the apportionment
cases. Once a showing is made that the population of state legisla-
tive districts deviates from Court-imposed standards, the state is
compelled to justify the deviations.
It is clear that in Burns v. Richardson the Court viewed the claim
that multi-member districts dilute the black vote as a fundamental
rights challenge. Only a showing of disproportionate impact was
required, and when the Court specified three ways by which an
invidious effect could more easily be shown, it was indicating to
future litigants precisely when a substantial burden on the right to
vote would be present.9
A race discrimination case can be challenged under one of three
equal protection doctrines. First, the law may be facially discrimi-
natory. Any legislative classification that discriminates against a
disadvantaged racial group, absent a compelling state interest, vio-
lates the equal protection clause.'0 Second, the law may dispropor-
tionately affect a racial minority. In addition to effect, the Court has
generally required proof of an official intent to discriminate. Third,
the law in a few instances may have such an egregious impact on a
racial minority that intent can be inferred or is irrelevant.10 1
This is a confused area of the law. In 1976, in Washington v.
Davis, 10 2 the Supreme Court made clear that proof of purpose was
necessary. Disproportionate impact, "[sitanding alone, . . . does
96. The method of identifying a fundamental right is unclear. They include those rights
explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, but they also include rights the Court believes are
implicit in the Constitution, i.e. the right to vote, the right of privacy, and the right to travel.
Because these rights are constitutionally based, a lesser standard of proof of violation is
required.
97. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
98. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
99. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
100. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
101. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 358
(1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
102. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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not trigger the rule . . . that racial classifications are to be sub-
jected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable by the weightiest
of considerations."'' 03 Many commentators have been very critical of
the Davis decision.1'0 Proof of a racially discriminatory purpose,
short of an admission, is a difficult standard to meet and has placed
many racial equal protection cases beyond the reach of existing
fourteenth amendment doctrines. A person who is suffering a rela-
tive disadvantage at the hands of government because of a facially
neutral law is nearly always without judicial remedy unless he can
prove present illicit intent. There is one exception.
Despite the implications of Davis, the Court did recognize that
the disproportionate impact of a law may be so egregious as to show
intentional discrimination.0 5 The egregious impact doctrine was
specifically endorsed by the Court in 1977 in the sequel to Davis,
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. 06 "Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds
other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even
when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face."'0 7 The
data contained in this article indicate that multi-member districts
have just such an egregious impact on the voting rights of the black
minority in city elections.08 Once this impact is shown the burden
of proof shifts to the state to justify the use of multi-member dis-
tricts "'by showing that permissible racially neutral selection cri-
teria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.' "09
It seems more reasonable, in light of past Supreme Court decisions,
to view the invidious discrimination of multi-member districts on
the voting rights of the black minority as a fundamental rights case.
However, if the Court persists in viewing it as a race discrimination
case the egregious impact would trigger the application of the com-
pelling state interest standard.
2. The Whitcomb Case
The Supreme Court first applied the suspect classification cri-
teria to a multi-member district case in Whitcomb v. Chavis."0
While it is important to understand what the Court did in
103. Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
104. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 49.
105. 426 U.S. at 241-42.
106. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). For a discussion of egregious impact, see Eisenberg, supra note
49, at 62-63.
107. 429 U.S. at 266.
108. See section III.C. infra.
109. 426 U.S. at 241 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
110. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
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Whitcomb, it is equally important to understand why. There was
no misunderstanding on the part of the Court of what standards
were set in Burns. Burns and Whitcomb are irreconcilable. The
holdings rest on two different equal protection doctrines. The views
of the Burger Court on the effect of multi-member districts on the
black vote differ from the views of the Warren Court. Those differ-
ences have become a part of our law.
In Whitcomb, the Supreme Court reversed an Indiana district
court which found that the use of multi-member districts in Marion
County (Indianapolis) impermissibly diluted the black vote. Al-
though every conceivable objection to multi-member districts was
raised in the case, the district court focused mostly on the claim that
blacks had no control over legislators "'because the effect of their
vote is cancelled out by other contrary interest groups' in Marion
County.""'
The district court's opinion had meticulously identified each ele-
ment of proof required by Fortson and Burns. The first requirement
was to show an "identifiable racial or political element within the
multi-member district ... ."I The court found that there was an
identifiable area within the county, Center Township Ghetto, in-
habited by blacks and differing from the surrounding white area in
housing conditions, education level, number of welfare recipients,
unemployment, and rate of juvenile delinquency.1 3 The court found
that these socioeconomic differences between the ghetto and white
areas led to different interests in substantive areas of the law such
as housing regulations, sanitation, welfare programs, garnishment
statutes, and unemployment compensation." 4
The second requirement was that the voting strength of this iden-
tifiable racial element be minimized or cancelled out. Marion
County was one large multi-member district which elected fifteen
state representatives and eight state senators."' The black minority,
with 17.8 percent of the population,"6 could have elected two repre-
sentatives and one senator in a single-member district system." 7
However, from 1960 to 1968 only 5.97 percent of the representatives
and 4.75 percent of the senators were elected from the Center Ghetto
Area."" By comparison, Washington Township, an upper middle
111. Id. at 129.
112. Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1359, 1386 (S.D. Ind. 1969). See 403 U.S. at 134.
113. 305 F. Supp. at 1375-80.
114. Id. at 1386.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1383.
117. Id. at 1385.
118. Id. at 1383.
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class suburban area with 14.6 percent of the population elected
52.27 percent of the senators and 41.79 percent of the representa-
tives."' The court also found evidence that the district's legislative
delegation tended to take common positions on proposed legislation,
reflecting the interests of the district's majority and consequently
ignoring minority interests.2 0
The district court also noted that all three of the elements that,
according to Burns, can help show invidious discrimination were
present in the apportionment scheme."1 The Marion County district
was large in relation to the total number of legislators. It elected
fifteen percent of the state representatives and sixteen percent of
the state senators. 22 It was not subdivided to assure distribution of
legislators over the entire county.'" And finally, both houses of the
General Assembly used multi-member districts, foreclosing the pos-
sibility that the adverse effect of multi-member districts in one
house would be balanced by the advantageous effect of single-
member districts in the other house.' 24
The Supreme Court in Whitcomb disagreed with the factual find-
ings and the legal conclusions of the district court. The Court mum-
bled the magic words of Reynolds, Fortson, and Burns about effec-
tive representation and minimization of voting strength2 5 and con-
cluded that the plaintiff had failed to meet the burden of proof
because "there is no suggestion here that Marion County's multi-
member district . . .[was] conceived or operated as [a] purpose-
ful [device] to further racial or economic discrimination."' 6 Justice
Harlan, although concurring in the judgment, wrote a scathing sep-
arate opinion chastising the Court for surreptitiously rejecting the
entire reapportionment theory developed over the last twenty
years.'2 While Harlan did not object to such a rejection, he did
object to the manner in which it was done.2 8 He pointed out that
according to precedent multi-member districts were unconstitu-
tional if they minimized the voting strength of racial or political
minorities, but when the district court invalidated the Marion
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1385.
121. Id. at 1386.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1387.
124. Id.
125. It is interesting to note that when the Court mentioned the legal standard set out in
Fortson, see supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text, it failed to quote the phrase
"designedly or otherwise." 403 U.S. at 136, 142 n.22, 143.
126. Id. at 149.
127. Id. at 167.
128. Id.
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County apportionment scheme for just that reason the Supreme
Court held that it had "'misconceived the Equal Protection
Clause.' "
The Court did not explain what evidence was necessary to prove
multi-member districting had a discriminatory purpose, but
pointed out that just because the number of legislators was not in
proportion to ghetto population did not prove invidious discrimina-
tion. 3 0 Short of a finding that ghetto residents had less opportunity
to participate in the political process than other Marion County
residents, the requirements of the equal protection clause were
unmet.' After all, in our political system "one candidate wins, the
others lose.'1 2 "The voting power of ghetto residents may have been
'cancelled out,' as the District Court held, but this seems a mere
euphemism for political defeat at the polls."'' 3
The opportunity to participate in the political process was the
new theme struck by the Whitcomb Court. To support its conclu-
sion that no discrimination was present in Marion County, the
Court noted it found nothing in the record indicating blacks were
not allowed to register to vote, to support the political party of their
choice, or to participate in party affairs and be equally represented
when candidates were selected.3 3 Reynolds v. Sims did not view the
infringement of the right to vote as a denial of that right, but rather
as a dilution of the effectiveness of the vote. 35 The emphasis of the
fifteenth amendment is a denial or an abridgment of the right of
blacks to cast their ballots. But the fourteenth amendment is sensi-
tive to the unequal impact of state imposed legislation.
This view of the right to vote is reminiscent of Justice Stewart's
comments in dissent in Lucas v. Forty-fourth General Assembly of
Colorado.33 He pointed out that no one's right to vote had been
denied. 37 Our system of representative government was not based
on one person casting one vote on election day. Political effective-
ness also encompassed the ideas of individuals forming groups, at-
tempting to influence governmental actions, and rewarding or pun-
ishing government response. But his view was rejected. The major-
ity of the Court felt there Was more to the constitutional guarantee
129. Id. at 165 (quoting id. at 160).
130. Id. at 149.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 153.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 149.
135. 377 U.S. at 555.
136. 377 U.S. 713, 744 (1964).
137. Id.
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of the right to vote'38 than being allowed to enter the voting booth
on election day. For certain minority interests, no matter how they
cast their ballots, the existence of multi-member districts as part of
the electoral system forecloses the possibility that they will be fairly
represented.
The Whitcomb Court's emphasis on discriminatory purpose, and
on the right to vote equaling the right to cast a ballot, is difficult to
reconcile with the usual equal protection analysis in a fundamental
rights case. The Court did not view Whitcomb as a fundamental
rights case at all, but rather as a suspect classification case. It
recognized in its opinion that the Civil War Amendments were de-
signed to protect the rights of blacks. 13 Whenever schemes are de-
vised by the states to disadvantage racial minorities, "[t]here has
been no hesitation in striking down those contrivances that can
fairly be said to infringe on Fourteenth Amendment rights."'' 1 The
Court viewed multi-member districts as such a contrivance. Multi-
member districts potentially deny to black minorities one of their
civil rights, the right to vote. If it were proven to the satisfaction of
the Court that multi-member districts infringed blacks' right to cast
a ballot, the Court would invoke the compelling state interest stan-
dard and require the state to prove that the use of the districts was
necessary to achieve a legitimate and compelling state interest. But
as the Court pointed out there was no suggestion that multi-member
districts were conceived as "purposeful devices to further racial or
economic discrimination."'' To trigger the compelling state interest
standard in a suspect classification case, it is necessary to show
proof of both effect and purpose.
The Court gave little indication in Whitcomb of how purpose was
to be proved. In 1973, in White v. Regester,"2 the first Supreme
Court case to invalidate the use of multi-member districts, the
Court indicated that proof of intent to deny blacks the right to
participate in the political process can be shown by the existence of
a history of official racial discrimination.' The existence of past
discrimination raises the probability that multi-member districts
are also a purposeful device to infringe on minority rights."' Of
considerable importance to the Court in Regester was the fact that
there had been only two blacks in the Dallas County legislative
138. See supra note 96.
139. 403 U.S. at 149.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
143. Id. at 766.
144. Id. at 767.
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delegation since Reconstruction and both had been slated by the
pervasive Dallas Committee for Responsible Government
(DCRG)."15 Also, the DCRG did not need the support of blacks to
win elections nor did it show concern for black interests."6 As re-
cently as 1970 the DCRG used racial campaign tactics to defeat
black supported candidates."7 This history of racial discrimination
in combination with anti-single shot voting devices'" was enough to
persuade the Court that blacks were unable to participate in "the
political process in a reliable and meaningful manner."'4 6
Regester is the last case in which the Supreme Court ruled di-
rectly on the effect of multi-member districts in diluting the black
vote. However, the Court has recently granted a writ of certiorari
to review the Fifth Circuit's holding in Bolden v. City of Mobile 5s
that at-large elections for the city commission "unconstitutionally
depreciates the value of the black vote.''5
145. Id. at 766.
146. Id. at 767.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 766. Dallas County used the anti-single shot device. It is a place system which:
separate[s] the candidates within a multi-member district into designated repre-
sentational seats. A separate electoral contest occurs for each seat within the dis-
trict ..... This system is usually combined with a requirement that the winning
candidate receive a majority of the votes cast for the seat, not simply by [sic] a
plurality. If a majority is not received in an initial election, then a runoff election
is held between the two highest vote recipients.
Engstrom, supra note 7, at 281 n.22.
149. 412 U.S. at 767. The reliance on past discrimination in Regester to show invidious
effect raises the question of whether the Court has two standards of proof in multi-member
district cases. The more rigorous Whitcomb standard is applied in the North where, it is
popularly believed, racial discrimination is less prevelant. In the South, with its history of
racial injustice, the Court presumes that multi-member districts are more likely to have a
discriminatory purpose. This presumption is ill-founded. Aside from multi-member districts
the most important variable in explaining the underrepresentation of blacks in cities is region
of the country, and it is th l North and not the South where blacks have the lowest propor-
tional representation on city councils. See supra section III.D.
150. 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978).
151. Id. at 245.
The Supreme Court's resolution of the Bolden v. City of Mobile controversy should be
interesting for at least two reasons: first, it requires the Court for the first time to face directly
the issue of the dilutive effect of at-large elections on the black vote, and second, it should
help clarify what proof is necessary to show discriminatory purpose. White v. Regester pre-
dates the Court's holding in Washington v. Davis that proof of racially discriminatory purpose
is a necessary element in a race discrimination case. See notes 106-13 supra and accompany-
ing text. Presently it is unclear whether the Regester approach to proving purpose is still
valid. Bolden v. City of Mobile raises that issue.
A city commission consisting of three members, all of whom are elected at-large,
governs the City of Mobile. Government by commission of this type was established
in 1911 by state law . . . which requires commission candidates to run for num-
bered positions and win by majority vote. Commission elections are non-partisan,
and therefore there are no primaries. There is no requirement that commissioners
reside in specified subdistricts.
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3. The Reasons for Whitcomb
The Court's shifting of standards in Whitcomb v. Chavis can be
explained in large part by the attitudes and values of the men who
now sit on the Supreme Court. In the mid-1960's a liberal coalition
charted the course of the Court. 5 ' The Court delivered startling new
decisions not only in the area of political rights, but also in civil and
criminal rights as well. The coalition was led by Chief Justice Earl
Warren, who wrote both Reynolds53 and Lucas,54 and was sup-
ported by Justices Douglas, 5  Goldberg, 151 and Brennan, who wrote
Baker, 57 Fortson, ,5s and Burns. 59 But four justices are not a majority
and the liberal coalition relied on the support of Justices Black and
White to defeat the conservative coalition, led by Justice Harlan.
Harlan dissented in Baker and Reynolds and was joined by Justices
Stewart and Clark in Lucas.60 Though the standards for dealing
with multi-member district cases were articulated in Fortson and
Burns, the actual holdings were against the challengers, who failed
571 F.2d at 241.
Plaintiffs in Bolden contend that White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Regester, are
controlling. Zimmer's multifactor circumstantial evidence test for dilution requires the dis-
trict courts to consider in dilution cases four primary factors: "the group's accessibility to
political processes, the responsiveness of representatives to the needs of the group, the weight
of the state policy behind at-large districting, and the effect of past discrimination upon the
electoral participation of the group." 571 F.2d at 242-43 n.5 (citing 485 F.2d at 1305). Addi-
tional criteria that may enhance the underlying dilution include: "the size of the district, the
portion of the vote necessary for election; if the positions are not contested for individually,
how many candidates an elector must vote for (i.e., whether there is an anti-single shot rule);
and whether candidates must reside in subdistricts." Id.
Defendants contest the claim of unconstitutionality of Mobile's government. "They con-
tend Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 . . . (1976), erects a barrier since the 1911 legislative
act forming the multi-member, at-large election of the commissioners was without racial
intent or purpose." Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 386 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
The court accepts the plaintiffs standard of proof. Implicit in that acceptance is that Davis
adds nothing to the Zimmer multifactor circumstantial evidence test for dilution. The next
move is up to the Supreme Court.
152. When Reynolds v. Sims was decided the Court membership included: Chief Justice
Earl Warren, and Associate Justices Brennan, Black, Goldberg, Douglas, Clark, White, Stew-
art, and Harlan.
153. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
154. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
155. Douglas dissented in Fortson v. Dorsey. He was willing to accept plaintiff's argument
that the differences in representational effectiveness between single-member and multi-
member districts were grounds for constitutional invalidation. 379 U.S. at 441-42.
156. By the time Burns v. Richardson was decided, Justice Goldberg had been replaced
by Justice Fortas. However, new to the Court, Justice Fortas took no part in the decision.
384 U.S. at 98.
157. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
158. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
159. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
160. 377 U.S. at 741, 744.
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to meet the standards. Harlan concurred in Fortson, but only in the
judgment." ' Stewart joined Harlan in Burns, but only out of respect
for precedent.6 2
By the early 1970's the membership of the Court had changed. 6 3
Chief Justice Earl Warren had retired and Warren Burger, a con-
servative, was appointed in his stead. Justice Blackmun, also a
conservative, replaced the liberal Fortas, and Justice Marshall, the
first black member of the Court, replaced Clark who stepped down
to forestall any claim of conflict of interest because his son Ramsey
had been appointed attorney general. While in Reynolds a four-
member liberal coalition relying on the support of Justices Black
and White was able to carry the day, in Whitcomb the newly formed
four-member conservative coalition was joined by Justices White
and Black and the liberals found themselves in dissent.
Since Whitcomb the conservatives have lost Justice Harlan, but
gained Justices Powell and Rehnquist, while the liberal coalition
has dwindled to two with the loss of Justice Douglas for a more
moderate jurist, Justice Stevens. The new Court's conservatism is
not only reflected in how it decides cases, but also in its perception
of its own role. One of the recurring themes in the Whitcomb deci-
sion is that the Court must examine not only the merits of the legal
claims raised, but also the consequences of the decision made. The
Whitcomb Court rejected the standard that disproportionate im-
pact alone was enough to invalidate multi-member districts because
it was fearful of what the legal and political consequences of a con-
trary decision would be." 4
The Court pointed out that multi-member districts are widely
employed in this country. The Court reasoned that if it accepted the
claim in Whitcomb, it would "spawn endless litigation."'"5 Every
political, religious and ethnic group would be before the Court
claiming that they too had a right to representation.16 However, it
hardly seems responsive to blacks who have been shut out of the
political process for the Court to say they cannot guarantee the right
of blacks to fair and effective representation because other groups
might also claim they have such a right. Evidently the Court over-
looked its earlier pronouncement in Whitcomb that the Civil War
161. 379 U.S. at 439.
162. 384 U.S. at 99.
163. When Whitcomb v. Chavis was decided the Court membership included: Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger, and Associate Justices Brennan, Black, Blackmun, Douglas, Marshall,
White, Stewart and Harlan.
164. 403 U.S. at 156-57.
165. Id. at 157.
166. Id. at 156.
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Amendments were designed specifically to protect the rights of
blacks." 7 The reason for those amendments is that blacks had been
the object of social and legal discrimination unmatched by any
other group in our political system. It is our impression that the
endless litigation argument is part of a larger concern on the part
of the Court.
When the Warren Court made its decisions in the reapportion-
ment cases, Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims, it was severely
criticized for involving the Supreme Court in an area that had tradi-
tionally been within the domain of state interest. The Court had
become the final arbiter in intrastate disputes over inequality in the
population of legislative districts. The Burger Court is unwilling to
assume the same role in the gerrymandering area, of which the
multi-member district issue is a part. In Reynolds v. Sims, Justice
Brennan, who wrote the majority decision, recognized that the
Court was being criticized for its new activism. He wrote: "Our
answer is this: a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands
judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us." '
There was little hesitation in involving the Court in an area of
traditional state concern, or in opening the doors of the Court to the
future litigation necessary to develop specific standards.
More than a decade later, the Burger Court has been unwilling
to take the needed first step by raising single-member districts to a
constitutional imperative. Worried about infringing on states' rights
by setting itself up as a federal arbiter of local electoral disputes,
the Court by judicial sleight of hand unveiled its new standard for
evaluating the claim that multi-member districts dilute black votes.
Using a suspect classification approach instead of a fundamental
rights approach accomplished two things for the conservative Court.
First, it minimized the Court's intrusion into the right of states to
govern their own affairs. The right of a state to control its own
electoral process is the key to its autonomy. The reapportionment
decisions, until equal population districting was accomplished,
turned over the responsibility of monitoring the state electoral pro-
cess to federal district courts. The intrusion of the federal govern-
ment was often met with hostility. With the widespread use of
multi-member districts, the courts would again be omnipresent in
the states' political process. However, a race discrimination case,
with the additional burden of proving the purpose of state officials,
would tend to minimize the pervasiveness of judicial control.' Sec-
167. Id. at 149.
168. 377 U.S. at 566.
169. We recognize that it is possible to require proof of purpose and still have pervasive
judicial control. Judicially monitored school desegregation beginning with Brown v. Board of
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ond, because the judicial standards that must be met in race dis-
crimination cases are well-developed, it would be unnecessary for
the Court to entertain a panoply of new cases to develop an appro-
priate judicial standard.
In addition to endless litigation, the Court also feared that its
acceptance of the claim that multi-member districts dilute black
votes would require that it accept the proposition that all interest
groups are guaranteed representation in proportion to their numbers
in society. 170 The goal set out in Reynolds v. Sims was not propor-
tional representation but fair and effective representation. The
Court adopted the "one person, one vote" standard because any-
thing less would mean that one person's vote counted for less than
another's-that every citizen did not have an equally effective voice
in the election of members of the state legislature. The claim in
multi-member district cases is not that blacks should be guaranteed
proportional representation but rather that multi-member districts
foreclose the possibility that blacks will ever be represented in pro-
portion to their population-that blacks will not have an equally
effective voice in election of members of the state legislatures so long
as multi-member districts exist. The Court intimated in Whitcomb
that it does not agree with those who contend that the only way a
group will be heard is by being represented in the legislative
forum. '
But how can a group which has been frozen out of the political
process, which cannot elect members from its own interest group,
influence state legislators who have not had to depend on them for
their own election? It is unrealistic to believe that legislators who
are the beneficiaries of the status quo are going to change the elec-
toral process to allow blacks a more effective voice. This was one of
the reasons the Court gave in Reynolds v. Sims for striking down
Alabama's reapportionment scheme.' The Alabama Legislature
had not reapportioned itself in sixty years-despite a state constitu-
tional guarantee of periodic reapportionment. This "[legislative
inaction, coupled with the unavailability of any political or judiqial
remedy"'7 was one thing that moved the Court to act. If the Court
rules against multi-member districts, it will not be forced to rule for
proportional representation. Instead, the Court would be requiring
Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), is the classic example of exactly that. However, that does
not dispel the argument that it is more difficult to make a case if it is necessary to prove
purpose in addition to effect.
170. 403 U.S. at 156-57.
171. Id. at 159-60.
172. 377 U.S. at 569-70.
173. Id. at 570.
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the state to justify the compelling necessity of an institutional ar-
rangement which denies racial minorities fair and effective repre-
sentation.
The third reason the Court has been reluctant to find multi-
member districts per se unconstitutional is that by doing so it would
be requiring states to use single-member districts. The Court is not
at all certain that single-member districts are not without their own
potential discriminatory effects.' The boundaries of legislative dis-
tricts can be drawn in such a way as to underrepresent or overrepre-
sent groups that the districting authorities might disfavor or favor.
The realization that delineational gerrymandering might also dilute
black votes should prompt the Court to greater vigilance in carefully
reviewing such cases as they come before the Court. It should not,
however, be used as an excuse for tolerating the discriminatory ef-
fects of multi-member districts. But even with their potentially dis-
criminatory effect, our data show that the use of single-member
districts results in blacks' receiving eighty-five percent of the repre-
sentation their proportion in the population warrants, while multi-
member districts significantly reduce black representation to forty-
two percent.'75 But the Court has not been willing to invoke the
compelling interest standard of review because in its view,
"experience and insight have not yet demonstrated that multi-
member districts are inherently invidious and violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment."'' 6 The data contained in this study provide
that insight in the context of city elections.
The Supreme Court has never considered the effect multi-
member districts have in diluting black voting potential in city
elections. All of the cases discussed in this article concern represen-
tation in state legislatures. The discriminatory effects of multi-
member districts considered in those cases are amplified in city
elections. Blacks have the greatest potential and the greatest need
for representation in cities. Blacks are becoming an increasingly
large percentage of the population in the nation's cities. They live
in concentrated geographical areas that would give them greater
representation if single-member districts were used. As the district
174. In Whitcomb, the Court said:
Moreover, if the problems of multi-member districts are unbearable or even uncon-
stitutional it is not at all clear that the remedy is a single-member district system
with its lines carefully drawn to ensure representation to sizable racial, ethnic,
economic, or religious groups and with its own capacity for overrepresenting and
underrepresenting parties and interests and even for permitting a minority of the
voters to control the legislature and government of a State.
403 U.S. at 160.
175. See Table 2 in section Ill.C. infra.
176. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 159-60.
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court pointed out in Whitcomb, blacks have unique problems in
housing, employment, sanitation, and welfare"' which are not
shared by the white majority and are in large part the responsibility
of city government. As a result, blacks have been unable to form
coalitions with those who share their interests. Relegated to minor-
ity status in an electoral process that responds only to majorities,
blacks have been denied fair and effective representation.
If the Court handles the dilutive effect of multi-member districts
as a fundamental rights case, it will be incumbent upon the black
plaintiff to show that multi-member districts significantly infringe
on the right of blacks to fair and effective representation. If the
Court persists in handling the dilutive effect of multi-member dis-
tricts as a suspect classification case, the plaintiffs must either show
a discriminatory purpose or show that the effects of multi-member
districts are so egregious that proof of discriminatory purpose is
unnecessary. But in either a fundamental rights case or a race dis-
crimination case, the Court will not automatically outlaw multi-
member districts. The Court will require the districting authority
to justify the compelling necessity of the use of multi-member dis-
tricts in city elections.
As will be shown in detail in the next section, this study indicates
first that there is a relationship between multi-member districts and
black underrepresentation. Second, the study shows that multi-
member districting is the single most important variable in explain-
ing black underrepresentation on city councils. And finally, the
study shows that multi-member districts independently contribute
to a significant reduction of black representation on city councils.
The dilutive effect is clear.
III. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE
This research provides systematic evidence that the choice of at-
large elections has an adverse impact on the representation afforded
blacks on city councils in 243 central cities of Standard Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (SMSA's).7 5 We identified all blacks serving
on the councils of these cities in October, 1976, by means of direct
telephoning, usually to the office of the city attorney or city clerk.' 9
177. Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364, 1386 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
178. A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area [SMSAI "must include 1 city with 50,000
inhabitants or more or 2 cities having contiguous boundaries and constituting . . . a single
community with a combined population of at least 50,000 the smaller of which must have a
population of at least 15,000." THE INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' ASSOCIATION, THE MUNICI-
PAL YEAR BOOK at 3 (1973).
179. We decided against using JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL RESEAR cH, NATIONAL ROSTER
OF BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS (1976) when it became clear to us on spot checking that this
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All 243 cities were reached and information was gathered on the
number and percent of blacks and other minorities serving on the
city council on that date, as well as the type of districts from which
they and other council members were elected. This data was inte-
grated into a larger data base which included demographic charac-
teristics for these same cities.
A. Measuring Black Representation on City Councils
According to our direct survey of the 243 cities of SMSA's, there
were a total of 2,378 elected councilmen. Of these councilmen, 276
were black, or 11.6 percent. Since the population of all central cities
is 20.4 percent black, this aggregate comparison was our first indica-
tion of black "underrepresentation."
The notion of "underrepresentation" implies that blacks should
be represented on the council in rough proportion to their percen-
tage in the city's population-and that "representation" means
physical presence on the council and not just influence with white
councilmen. This notion of representation is not above challenge on
theoretical or legal grounds. The United States Supreme Court in
Whitcomb rejected the notion that blacks are entitled to representa-
tion in proportion to their population, but to measure the effect of
multi-member districting, it is necessary to establish some identifi-
able standard. The objective is not to guarantee blacks proportional
representation but to determine the reasons why they have not
achieved representation in proportion to their numbers.
We have computed the black percentage of the city council for
each of our 243 central cities. We shall refer to this figure as "Black
Incumbency." More importantly, we have computed a "Black Rep-
resentation Index" for each city. This Black Representation Index
is the percentage of blacks on the city council, divided by the per-
centage of blacks in the city's population. This Index has several
properties. If the Index is 1.00, then blacks have council representa-
tion in exact proportion to their percentage of the population. If the
Index is less than 1.00, then blacks are "underrepresented"; if it is
over 1.00, they are "overrepresented" on the council. The value of
the Index is its convenience and ease of interpretation. An Index of
.50 indicates that blacks are receiving one-half of the representation
they are entitled to given their proportion of the population. If there
are no black councilmen, the Black Representation Index is zero.
The Index is not a direct function of the size of the black population
publication does not include all of the nation's black councilmen and fails to keep up-to-date.
Further, we learned that THE MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK does not classify cities in the same fashion
as city officials classify their cities-particularly with regard to types of election district.
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in the city, but rather of the black population in relation to blacks
on the city council.
For most of the following observations, we have also introduced a
"threshold" notion for black population percentages in cities. The
threshold was set at fifteen percent, and most of our calculations of
black representation are made only for those cities which have a
black population of at least fifteen percent. The rationale for such
a "threshold" is that we might not reasonably expect black repre-
sentation on a city council until the black population reached this
level, justifying representation on a seven-member council. While
this "threshold" notion is an awkward one, the alternative is to list
all cities without black councilmen as zero on the Black Representa-
tion Index, even if there are relatively small numbers of blacks
living in some of those cities.
B. Black Representation on City Councils
Before turning to the impact of at-large elections on black repre-
sentation, it is interesting to observe national figures on black repre-
sentation on city councils. Table 1 shows that 11.6 percent of all the
council seats in 243 central cities of SMSA's were held by blacks.
The Black Representation Index for all 243 central cities was .50,
indicating that blacks in 1976 occupied only half of the council seats
that their city population percentages warranted. Stated another
way, blacks would have to double their number of city councilmen
in order to acquire representation in proportion to their percentage
of central city populations.
TABLE 1
BLACK REPRESENTATION ON COUNCILS OF
CENTRAL CITIES OF SMSA'S IN THE UNITED STATES
Cities with 15%
All Cities Black Population
N=243 N=105
Black Incumbency
Percentage of Black Councilmen 11.6 20.8
Black Representation Index
Black Percent of Council - Black
Percent of City Population .50 .60
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If we introduce our "threshold" concept of fifteen percent black
population, the extent of black underrepresentation across the na-
tion improves somewhat-but not much. Table 1 shows that the
Black Representation Index for the 105 central cities with fifteen or
more percent black population is .60, compared to .50 for all 243
cities. This means that even in cities where blacks constitute a
significant portion of the population, blacks receive less than two-
thirds of the representation on city councils that their population
warrants. Eighteen of the 105 cities with fifteen percent black popu-
lations have all-white councils.
C. Black Underrepresentation and At-Large Elections
To ascertain the impact of at-large versus ward elections on the
representation afforded blacks in large cities, we first had to classify
cities according to the type of election district employed in council-
manic elections. On the basis of our 243 telephone interviews with
city attorneys and blacks, we established the following classifica-
tions:
At-Large: 108 cities in which any resident may run for any seat.
Forty-one of these cities exceeded the "threshold" requirement of
fifteen percent black population.
At-Large with Residency Requirements: Twenty cities in which
residents must live in a prescribed district but the entire city votes
in their election; ten of these cities exceeded the "threshold" re-
quirement.
Mixed: Sixty-four cities where one or more council members are
elected at-large and one or more elected by districts or wards. (This
includes fifteen cities where the mayor is the at-large council mem-
ber.) Thirty-seven of these cities met the "threshold" requirement.
Ward: Thirty-six cities where all council members are elected
by district. Seventeen of these cities met the "threshold" require-
ment.
Black representation is significantly greater in cities with ward
elections than in cities with at-large elections. Even when we exam-
ine only those cities with fifteen or more percent black populations,
the representation of the blacks in at-large cities is significantly less
than in ward cities. (See Table 2). In at-large cities, blacks received
only .42 of the representation warranted by their population. But in
ward cities, blacks received .85 of the representation warranted by
their population. In other words, in the average ward election city,
blacks were approaching "fairness" in representation-a black per-
centage on councils which was roughly equivalent to the black per-
centage of the city's population. But in at-large cities, blacks re-
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WITH MORE THAN FIFTEEN PERCENT
BLACK POPULATION
Black Representation Index
Mean Number of Cities
Type of District (total = 105) 0 0-.50 .50-1.00 1.00+
At-Large (N=41) .42 14 9 13 5
At-Large with Residency (N=10) .48 3 2 4 1
Mixed (N=37) .73 2 5 23 7
Ward (N=17) .85 0 1 10 6
Residency requirements in at-large elections apparently have
no significant effect on the Black Representation Index of at-large
cities (.42) and at-large-with-residency-requirements cities (.48).
On the other hand, mixed (ward and at-large) elections improved
black representation significantly. In mixed election cities, with fif-
teen percent or more black population, blacks received .73 of the
representation warranted by their population-lower than the .85 in
ward cities but much better than the .48 in at-large cities.
One should note that there is some black "overrepresentation" in
certain central cities. By "overrepresentation" we mean black coun-
cil member percentages which are greater than the black population
percentage of the city. Indeed, in nineteen cities (out of 105 cities
with fifteen percent or more black populations) the black percent-
age of the city council exceeded the black percentage of the city
population.
D. Multi-variable Analysis: At-large Elections, Socioeconomic
Status, and Black Representation
It is clear that multi-member districts are related to "black repre-
sentation" on city councils. However, there are probably many fac-
tors that contribute to the success or failure of black candidates in
city elections-factors other than the structural characteristics of
municipal elections. 80 We wanted to be certain that at-large elec-
180. Moreover, there is the troublesome problem of the interrelatedness of structural
characteristics of municipal elections and the socioeconomic composition of urban popula-
tions. We know, for example, that low ethnicity, higher income, white collar occupations,
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tions independently contribute to the underrepresentation afforded
blacks on city councils-that black underrepresentation is directly
attributable to reformed structures and not merely a product of the
socioeconomic composition of the population.
To test the effect of our structural variable on black representa-
tion, in relation to other social and economic variables which might
influence black representation, we constructed a variety of regres-
sion problems with the Black Representation Index as the depen-
dent variable."' Our independent variable included measures of:
size (population logged)
region (northeast, south, midwest, west, as separate dummy vari-
ables)
percent non-white
education (median school completed by population over age 25)
occupation (percent of work force professional, managerial, or
sales)
in.come (median family income)
for the entire city. We also included measures of the socioeconomic
condition of the black population of the city:
black education (median school year completed by black popula-
tion over age 25)
black occupation (percent of black work force in professional, man-
agerial, or sales)
black income (median black family income)
We felt that the socioeconomic status (SES) level of the black popu-
lation may be more important in determining the Black Representa-
tion Index than the SES level of the entire city population. Finally,
we of course included our structural variables in different problems.
In every regression problem on the Black Representation Index,
at-large elections turned out to be the single most influential inde-
pendent variable. At-large elections, independently of any other
higher education levels, densities, age, and size of city are all related to "reformed" govern-
mental structures. See Alford & Scoble, Political and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Amer-
ican Cities, INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT AssOCIATION, in THE MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK 82
(1965); Dye & MacManus, Predicting City Government Structure, 20 AMER. J. POL. Sc1. 257
(1976); Kessel, Governmental Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note about
American Cities, 56 AMER. POL. ScL REv. 615 (1962).
181. Regression analysis is a general statistical technique through which one can analyze
the relationship between a dependent variable (Black Representation Index) and a set of
independent variables (those listed in the text as well as at-large elections). The ideal is to
explain the level of black representation in cities. A number of variables (the independent
variables) will help to explain the Black Representation Index (dependent variable). Regres-
sion analysis determines how useful each of the independent variables is in explaining the
level of black representation in cities.
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socioeconomic or structural variable, significantly reduce black rep-
resentation on city councils. Table 3 presents one of the many re-
gression problems which were run.
TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF BLACK REPRESENTATION
ON CITY COUNCILS FOR CITIES WITH AT
LEAST FIFTEEN PERCENT BLACK POPULATION1s
2
Dependent Variable = Black Representation Index
RlSS R 2 184 Sign
1 5  B186
At-Large Elections .34 .12 - .46
Mayor Council Government .41 .17 + .26
Northeast Region .45 .20 - .26
Black Education .49 .24 + .28
Partisanship .55 .30 + .13
Size .56 .31 - .15
Black Percent of Population .57 .32 + .10
Income .58 .34 + .20
Education .58 .34 ± .12
Black Income .60 .37 + .11
Occupation .61 .37 + .03
182. Structural variables and region are presented as dummy variables. Variables enter
stepwise according to their contribution to R2.Only significant variables are entered; others
are dropped. Analysis is based on all 105 cities of 50,000 or more population, which are central
cities of SMSA's, and which have at least fifteen percent black population. R and R, are
cumulative. B is the standardized b value.
183. The Pearson correlation coefficient, R, is used to measure the strength of the relation-
ship between two variables. There is a perfect relationship if variable X increases by one unit
as variable Y increases by one unit and R would take on the value of 1.0. If X and Y are
unrelated, R would be 0. The correlation between multi-member districts and the Black
Representation Index is .34 which indicates a moderately strong relationship. Remember that
both R and R2 are cumulative. The correlation between Mayor Council Government and
Black Representation Index is .07 and when added to .34 totals .41.
184. Squaring the Pearson R results in the statistic denoted by R'. Its usefulness derives
from the fact that RI is a measure of the proportion of variance in one variable explained by
another. In other words, 12% of the variance in the Black Representation Index is explained
by the existence of at-large elections in a city. The at-large election plus a mayor council
government explain 17% of the variance in the Index.
185. The Pearson R not only indicates the strength of the relationship between two vari-
ables, but also the direction of the relationship. A negative relationship means that where
at-large elections are present, black representation decreases. A positive relationship between
the Black Representation Index and, for example, black education means that as black
education increased black representation also increased.
186. B is used here to indicate the relative weight of the independent variables on the
Black Representation Index. Clearly the at-large election with a B of .46 has a greater effect
on black representation than any other independent variable. More technically B is a beta
weight, a standardized b. The b in the regression formula is the slope of the regression line
and indicates the expected change in the dependent variable with a change of one unit in
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Interestingly, region also ranks high as an independent determi-
nant of black underrepresentation-with the Northeast contribut-
ing to a decline in black representation. This regional finding was
unexpected-especially the finding that the Northeast, and not the
South, is a major "culprit" in lowering black representation.
Size and black percentage of the population were positively
associated with black representation: large cities with large black
populations have better ratios of blacks on their councils vis-a-vis
blacks in the population than small cities with smaller black popu-
lations. (This is true even when we exclude all cities with less than
fifteen percent black population.)
Finally, black education level ranks as a significant and indepen-
dent determinant of black representation in cities. This variable
appears to be the most important SES variable-more important
than the socioeconomic level of the community as a whole. In other
words, the educational level of blacks is more important in gaining
equity in representation than the SES level of the whole (or white)
community.
E. Increasing Black Representation on City Councils
Admittedly, much of the variation in the Black Representation
Index remains unexplained. In all of our regression problems, RI
remained at or slightly below .40. Fully sixty percent of inequality
in representation remains unexplained. We suspect that, in addition
to the variables noted here as important determinants of black rep-
resentation, many other factors are at work in our cities affecting
black politics, including the degree of organization and ease of com-
munication among black groups, the extent of factionalism among
black groups, the existence of crystallizing issues, and variations
among the white populations of cities in their degree of prejudice
toward black candidates.
The evidence among the aggregate of cities (all cities of 50,000 or
more with at least fifteen percent black population) is clear: at-
large elections are the single most important obstacle to blacks
achieving representation on city councils commensurate to their
numbers in the population.
the independent variable; b would therefore reflect the units in which the independent
variable was measured and would make it impossible to compare the effect of different in-
dependent variables measured in different units. By standardizing the b, by putting all of
the different b's into one common unit, it becomes possible to compare the relative strength
of a variety of independent variables.
A T-LARGE ELECTIONS
V. CONCLUSION: ON THE DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS OF AT-LARGE
ELECTIONS
This study indicates, first, that there is a relationship between at-
large elections and black underrepresentation. In at-large election
cities, blacks received forty-two percent of the representation war-
ranted by their percent of the population. But in ward cities, blacks
received eighty-five percent. In neither ward nor at-large election
cities are blacks represented on city councils in proportion to their
numbers in the population. But in ward cities blacks are approach-
ing proportionality in representation. In at-large election cities
blacks receive slightly less than half of the representation they re-
ceive in ward cities.
Second, the study shows that an at-large election is the single
most important variable in explaining black underrepresentation on
city councils. Once it is determined that there is a relationship
between two variables, at-large elections and black underrepre-
sentation, it is then important to determine the form of the relation-
ship. At-large elections are not, of course, the only factor contribut-
ing to black underrepresentation. Many factors contribute to the
success or failure of black candidates in city elections. The study
examined ten other factors, mainly socioeconomic variables that
might also be important in explaining black underrepresentation,
and measured the relative importance of each of those variables. At-
large elections remained the single most significant variable in ex-
plaining black underrepresentation.
Third, the study shows that at-large elections independently con-
tribute to a significant reduction of black representation on city
councils. Although at-large elections are the most important vari-
able in causing black underrepresentation it is important to deter-
mine whether or not at-large elections alone cause a significant
reduction in black representation. In other words, if at-large elec-
tions significantly reduce black representation only when they are
found in a particular combination with other socioeconomic vari-
ables, then declaring at-large elections unconstitutional would not
result in a significant increase in black representation. Statistically
it is possible to hold constant these other socioeconomic variables
and to measdre only the effect of at-large elections. When that was
done it was found that the existence of at-large elections causes a
statistically significant reduction in black representation indepen-
dent of the other variables.
"Fair and effective" representation cannot be achieved without
eliminating the use of at-large elections as a device for diluting the
voting strength of racial minorities in American cities. Inequality of
representation is built into the basic structure of at-large elections.
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The Supreme Court should adopt a per se standard of proof analo-
gous to that developed in the malapportionment cases. An invidious
discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment should be
presumed and the burden of proof would shift to the state to justify
the compelling necessity of at-large elections. The plaintiffs would
not be required to show that the districting authorities purposely
discriminated against a particular minority group. A finding of un-
constitutionality would therefore be based on the rationale that the
effect of at-large elections is so invidious and so well-known that the
districting authorities could have no other purpose but to discrimi-
nate. At-large election systems are inherently discriminatory. Fair
and effective representation cannot be achieved so long as the at-
large system is the basic method of election in the cities.
